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ABSTRACT  
The two-way continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) systems allow higher key rates and improved 
transmission distances over standard telecommunication networks in comparison to the one-way CVQKD protocols. To 
exploit the real potential of two-way CVQKD systems a robust reconciliation technique is needed. It is currently 
unavailable, which makes it impossible to reach the real performance of a two-way CVQKD system. The reconciliation 
process of correlated Gaussian variables is a complex problem that requires either tomography in the physical layer that 
is intractable in a practical scenario, or high-cost calculations in the multidimensional spherical space with strict 
dimensional limitations. To avoid these issues, we propose an efficient logical layer-based reconciliation method for 
two-way CVQKD to extract binary information from correlated Gaussian variables. We demonstrate that by operating 
on the raw-data level, the noise of the quantum channel can be corrected in the scalar space and the reconciliation can be 
extended to arbitrary high dimensions. We prove that the error probability of scalar reconciliation is zero in any practical 
CVQKD scenario, and provides unconditional security. The results allow to significantly improve the currently available 
key rates and transmission distances of two-way CVQKD. The proposed scalar reconciliation can also be applied in one-
way systems as well, to replace the existing reconciliation schemes.   
Keywords: continuous-variable quantum key distribution, reconciliation, Gaussian variables, Gaussian modulation, 
quantum cryptography, quantum Shannon theory. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) systems represent one of the most important practical applications of quantum 
information theory. The QKD schemes allow unconditionally secret communication between distant parties by 
exploiting the fundamental attributes of quantum mechanics. The QKD protocols can be classified into two main classes: 
DV (Discrete-Variable) and CV (Continuous-Variable) QKD systems. The firstly introduced QKD protocols were based 
on discrete variables, such as photon polarization. Since the polarization of single photons cannot be encoded and 
decoded efficiently because of the technological limitations of current physical devices, the CVQKD systems were 
proposed. In a CVQKD system, the information is encoded on continuous variables by a Gaussian modulation, such as 
in the position or momentum quadratures of coherent states. In comparison to DVQKD, the modulation and decoding of 
continuous variables does not require specialized devices and can be implemented efficiently by standard 
telecommunication networks and technologies that are currently available and in widespread use. As follows, the 
CVQKD systems can be integrated into the current telecommunication networks by using well-established optical fiber 
networks and practical devices. The CVQKD protocols can be further classified into one-way and two-way systems. In a 
one-way CVQKD system, Alice, the sender transmits her continuous variables to the receiver, Bob, over a quantum 
channel [9-11]. In a two-way system, Bob starts the communication, Alice adds her internal secret to the received 
message, and this is then sent back to Bob (e.g., one mode of the coupled beam that is outputted from a beamsplitter is 
transmitted back to Bob).  
The two-way CVQKD systems were introduced for practical reasons to exceed the limitations of one-way CVQKD, 
such as low key rates and short communication distances [1-8]. The two-way CVQKD protocols exploit the benefits of 
multiple channel uses and allow the leak of only lower valuable information to the eavesdropper, and they are also 
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equipped with significantly stronger capabilities in comparison to one-way protocols. Turning our attention to two-way 
CVQKD from one-way CVQKD is definitely reasonable, since one-way schemes have almost reached their physical 
limitations, and no significant further improvements can be realized in the secret key rates and transmission distances, 
neither by applying more robust post-processing nor by more powerful reconciliation techniques. 
The CVQKD schemes use continuous-variable Gaussian modulation which provably provides optimal key rates 
against collective attacks at finite-size block lengths [1-11] and also maximizes the mutual information between Alice 
and Bob. The security of CVQKD has also been proven against collective attacks in the asymptotic regime with infinite 
block sizes, while the analysis of arbitrary attacks in the finite-size regime is currently in progress [9]. One of the most 
critical points in regard to CVQKD is the post-processing [1-11]. The post-processing is aimed to correct the errors of 
the quantum channel that are cumulated in the raw data. The raw data is a correlated binary bitstring at Alice’s and 
Bob’s side, generated by the random quadrature measurements at the parties. Each quadrature measurement results in a 
unit in the raw data. The raw data itself contains no secret key; it consists only of the results of the random quadrature 
measurements. The secret key is a uniformly distributed long binary string that will be combined with the raw data 
elements, and will be added to the picture only in the stage of logical layer manipulations. The logical layer-based post-
processing phase uses purely classical tools: precisely a classical-authenticated communication channel and classical 
error-correction algorithms. The logical-layer based post-processing basically does the same in the logical layer as the 
tomography does in the physical layer, and it consists of two main phases: the reconciliation procedure with several 
error-correction steps, and privacy amplification. The aim of reconciliation is to extract as much valuable information 
from the correlated raw data as possible and to generate an error-free key between Alice and Bob. The privacy 
amplification operates on the shared, error-corrected common secret to extract the final key between the parties, and the 
aim of this phase is to reduce to zero the possible knowledge of an eavesdropper from the elements of the key. The 
implementation of tomography in the physical layer is a complex problem, and it is intractable in a practical scenario. 
But, fortunately, well-characterized solutions can be proposed in the logical layer for the same purpose of giving an 
analogous, and also more valuable answer to the reconciliation of correlated Gaussian variables than the physical-layer 
tomography ever could. The theoretical background that makes the logical layer-based reconciliation possible also allow 
us to view the noisy physical quantum channel as a binary Gaussian channel in the logical layer [9-11]. This has the 
immediate consequence that very efficient binary error-correction tools can be integrated from the world of traditional 
communication theory into CVQKD—which would not be available for the physical-layer tomography to extract binary 
information from the correlated Gaussian variables. 
The raw data shared over the quantum channel is noisy, and this must be corrected to distill the final secret key. 
Since a large amount of raw data bits have to be shared between the parties, the complexity of the post-processing phase 
is a critical point in CVQKD protocols, and it has to be in order to be as low as possible. The existing logical layer-based 
solutions require high-complexity calculations in the high-dimensional spherical space for the reconciliation of Gaussian 
variables [9-11]. Since a complex reconciliation is so undesirable, the aim is to find a more efficient solution in the 
logical layer. Basically, the error correction in the reconciliation phase consists of two phases: First, the binary-channel 
codes (such as LDPC – Low Density Parity Check, turbo codes, polar codes, etc. [9-11]) that are used for the 
transmission of the classical bits in the reconciliation phase are corrected. Second, the real Gaussian noise on the 
received raw-data vector must be corrected, which noise arises from the effect of the quantum channel (i.e., from Eve’s 
optimal Gaussian attack, which is considered in CVQKD protocols [1-11]). In this work we focus on the second phase of 
reconciliation, which has crucial role in CVQKD, since this phase makes it possible to correct the errors incurred on the 
quantum channel and to share an error-free key between Alice and Bob. Since the raw data is formulated by binary 
bitstrings resulted from quadrature measurements at the parties, the reconciliation problem is analogous to the well-
known subject of binary-channel coding that operates on binary-channel codes. It also follows that the complicated and 
difficult to implement physical-layer tomography can be replaced in the logical level by binary error-correction schemes 
that are easier to implement. At this point we arrived to a critical security requirement of QKD. In the reconciliation 
phase, only uniform distribution can be transmitted over the classical channel, otherwise the information theoretic 
security of the protocol cannot be proven [1-13]. The raw data itself follows Gaussian random distribution because these 
arise from a Gaussian random source; however, by applying some trivial operations on the raw data units, the desired 
uniform distribution can be reached, and the reconciliation can be performed with unconditional security.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some preliminary findings of two-way CVQKD are summarized. In 
Section 3, we introduce the proposed reconciliation scheme. Section 4 provides the error analysis of the reconciliation 
scheme. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper. For further details and information see [27]. 
 
 
 
 
2. DIRECT CODING IN THE PHASE SPACE 
Let us denote the quadratures of the i-th signal  in the phase space  by , and the quadratures of Bob’s 
signal  in the phase space  by , where   and  are drawn 
from a Gaussian random distribution with mean , and variance , where  is the modulation variance [1-10].  
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After the two beams  and  are correlated at a BS at Alice’s side, where  is the noisy version of 
, Alice applies a random quadrature measurement  on the first mode of the beam, while the second mode is 
transmitted back to Bob over quantum channel 
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or, if she used the momentum quadrature basis she gets 
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The second mode of the combined signal in  is transmitted directly back to Bob over the noisy channel A B´ 2 , given 
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with  distributed Gaussian random quadratures, and (
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In the next phase, Bob applies a random quadrature measurement  (assumed to be homodyne) and gets block . If 
he used a position quadrature basis, he gets 
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and for the momentum quadrature basis he obtains: 
,i A i BY p p¢ ¢ ¢¢= - .                                                                       (7) 
Bob, calibrating his resulted block  by  or  (depending on the used quadrature measurement), gets back 
the noisy version  of Alice’s raw data unit  as: 
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which is referred as Bob’s raw data unit. The noise of the quantum channel is analogous to the addition of a non-
standard Gaussian random noise vector  to Alice’s raw data block .  iD iX
Alice’s and Bob’s modes in the combined phase space  right after being outputted from the BS are A B´ ij  and if , 
as shown in Fig. 1. Alice obtains the first mode of the beam, ij , the second mode if  is sent back to Bob. The noise 
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For further information see [27]. 
3. SCALAR RECONCILIATION OF A GAUSSIAN MODULATION  
We start our description from the point at which the quantum states are completely transmitted through the quantum 
channel from Alice to Bob. At this point all interactions with the quantum channel are closed, and the post-processing 
phase is being started. First, Alice and Bob exclude from the raw data those measurements that have been performed in 
different quadratures that results in the N-unit length raw data vectors. Then formulate N d  number of d-dimensional 
vectors , . These quantities are introduced as follows. dj ÎX  dj¢ ÎX 
Let  and  the N-unit length raw data of Alice and Bob. The d-dimensional vectors  
and , 
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where  and  refer to the i-th unit of the j-th vector, respectively. Alice and 
Bob have to share a common secret by using their correlated raw data. For this purpose, they establish a proper code-
alphabet , where a  and b  are two public variables (i.e., Eve also has access to it). In the reverse 
reconciliation these will be selected uniformly at random in the form of several -s at Bob’s side, with 
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As follows, Bob granulates the selected a or b into d number of uniformly random variables ,j iU , so that the sum of the 
units will be equal to the selected value.  
The full key K  is built up as:  
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The reconciliation problem in the level of logical layer is summarized as follows. Alice and Bob first agree on d. Bob 
sends the blocks of , ( ) dj j¢ ÎX U  ( ) =0, 1for j j N d£C - , over the classical channel. Alice then receives the d 
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and then she has to make an error-correction to remove the noise from jU ¢ .  
In comparison to the multidimensional reconciliation, the scalar reconciliation uses a fundamentally different 
solution to achieve the uniform distribution of the raw data. While the former is based on sophisticated multidimensional 
spherical operations, our solution requires only the use of a simple function in the scalar space. In our scheme, the 
uniformity of the correlated raw data units is achieved by the Gaussian Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF). 
Another important difference is that the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel can be achieved by 
arbitrary dimensional vectors with arbitrary accuracy, which is justified by the Central Limit Theorem (CLT).  
On Alice’s and Bob’s side, the Gaussian CDF function can be used to reach the uniform distribution of the 
correlated raw data. Since we assumed reverse reconciliation let us to start the description from Bob’s perspective. Let 
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is the Gauss error function, and  is a real variable from the range of ( ),j iC X ¢ Î  0,1é ùë û , with   uniform distribution 
(for a plausible example see Supplementary Information of [27]). The quantity ( , )j iC X ¢  will be referred as the CDF-
transformed unit.  
Alice also applies the CDF transformation, and takes into account her raw data variance  for the units of 2Xs ,j iX  to get 
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and the result of (17) and (19) is the correlated uniform raw data ( ) (, ),j iC X C X ¢» j i . In the reconciliation process, 
only Alice can correct jU ¢  into jU , because nobody knows the CDF-transformed raw data units ( , )j iC X , except Alice.  
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Applying the results for Bob’s raw data the CDF-transformed vector is:  
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In the multidimensional case, the precision of the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel (i.e., the quality 
of the physical-logical channel conversion) was quantified by the Dirac distribution [9-11]. Since in the scalar 
reconciliation the spherical space is eliminated, a different solution was needed to analyze the accuracy of the conversion 
between the physical-logical Gaussian channels. Our answer for the problem is the Central Limit Theorem and a 
mathematical result from the 19th century – the so-called Lyapunov-condition [26]. The accuracy of the physical-logical 
conversion of scalar reconciliation can be maximized and it can be made in arbitrary high dimensions as it is being stated 
in Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1. The noise variance of the converted logical binary Gaussian channel asymptotically coincidences with the 
noise variance of the physical quantum channel, which allows to reach the theoretical maximum of the capacity of the 
converted logical binary channel.  
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To show that (23) holds for the d-dimensional noise parameter jd , we exploit the Lyapunov-condition [26]. Let , 
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is satisfied for any d , by theory. As follows, the noise on  will converge to  ¥ dj ÎU 
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and the resulting logical channel will be equivalent to a logical binary Gaussian channel with noise variance 2
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same argumentation, the variance of the resulting logical binary Gaussian channel will converge to the variance of the 
physical Gaussian quantum channel  for N . 
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is satisfied by theory, from which  
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å å
CLT 
 

 
,1
s
                                       (28) 
follows, which proves the statement.  
Hence one can readily recognize that  
( ) ( )220 1lim var N dN N dd s-¥ é ù =ê úë û  .                                                             (29) 
To conclude the situation, in (23) and (28) the variances of jd  and ( ) 10
N d
jj
d-=å , indeed, are not scaled up by d and 
N d ,  which makes possible to convert the physical Gaussian quantum channel to a logical binary Gaussian channel 
with noise variance  for arbitrary d. In other words, these results allow for one to obtain the lowest noise 
variance and hence, the highest SNR of the logical channel that is possible by theory, because the noise variance 
2
2 2
j
d ds s» 
2
jds  is 
lower bounded by 
2
, i.e., 
2
 holds, by theory. At the resulting SNR, the capacity of the logical binary 
Gaussian channel also picks up its maximum. From this one can immediately conclude, that, in fact, it is a favorable 
result because the logical channel is indeed a binary Gaussian channel which is equipped with the same capacity at low 
SNRs (which is the situation in an experimental long-distance scenario) than the physical Gaussian quantum channel. In 
our solution, the lower bound 
2
 is precisely reached and is justified by the Lyapunov-condition, which means 
that our conversion provides the best approximation that is possible. 
2s jd
jd
2 2s s³ 
2 2s s= 
The key idea is as follows: do the reconciliation in the scalar space to reduce the problem from d-G  d  in o  . 
 this point, the main drawback of the multidimensional reconciliation approaches has to be clear: the processes 
required the use of spherical space  of  to achieve the uniform distribution. As we have found in a CVQKD 
scenario it is not a required condition, and completely can be eliminated. Why? Because, the fact, that the uniformly 
distributed elements of  have to be transmitted over the classical authenticated channel, per se, does not imply that 
the reconciliation has to be executed in the spherical space. The spherical correction of the errors of the raw data is a 
completely undesirable and unwanted event in a practical CVQKD, because it would just cause a further decrease in the 
very fragile, sensitive, and so strenuously established secret key rates. The use of  of  served only one purpose 
in the multidimensional reconciliation: to guarantee the security requirements of the QKD post-processing phase. From 
this it immediately can be concluded that the use of spherical space is, in fact, unnecessary, and a mathematically 
equivalent and more efficient solution exists in the scalar space of .  
1  of t
At
1d-G n
d
1d-G d

 
 
 
 
At this point, one can recognize two improvements in our proposed scheme in comparison to the existing approaches. 
First, the uniform distribution will be reached by a simple operation, the Gaussian-CDF function applied separately on 
each unit of the raw data. Second, the approximation of the Gaussian channel will be justified by the CLT, using 
arbitrary dimensional vectors. As follows, the physical-logical channel conversion can be established with arbitrary high 
precision, since the  limitation has also been eliminated from the picture. To conclude, the spherical space can be 
replaced by the CDF transformation on the raw data units, and the Dirac distribution can be replaced by the CLT. It is 
clear now that the existing reconciliation methods require a revision since its application just leads to further slow-down 
in a practical CVQKD scenario. By these reasons, we drop away the spherical space, and instead of it, use the CDF-
transformed units. These improvements allow very efficient decoding and error-correction, however, this step does not 
modify any fine property of the code: in other words, it keeps the desired uniform distribution and guarantees the 
arbitrary high-precision in the approximation of the logical binary Gaussian channel. Finally, we have to emphasize 
again that the whole reconciliation procedure is implemented through the logical layer only, without any need of 
physical-layer tomography. For the further details see [27]. 
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3.1 Run of scalar reconciliation 
The run of scalar reconciliation (assuming reverse reconciliation) is sketched as follows. Bob divides his N-unit length 
raw data X  into ¢ n N d=  number of d-dimensional vectors , where d  is the length 
of the vectors measured in units 
( ),0 , 1, , T dj j j dX X -¢ ¢ ¢=X  Î 
,j iX ¢  in the raw data. Then for each j¢X , applies CDF transformation C on the units 
 of ,j iX ¢ Î  j¢X ,  0, 1 for i i -d= £ , ( ) 0,  1for j j N d= £ - . Bob generates  
, computes 
( ),0 1 ,T dj j j dU U -= ÎU  ,
,j iU Î  ( )j jC ¢X U
X
, and sends it to Alice over the classical authenticated channel. Alice also divides her N-
unit length raw data , into n N=
( )
d  number of d-dimensional vectors , computes 
the CDF-transformed vectors 
( ), 1, , T dj dX X -= Î ,0j jX
jC  and decodes as  X
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
,0
1
,0
1
1 1
, ,0 0
.
j
d
j ii
d
j ii
j j j C X
C Xd d
j i j ii iC X
U C X U
U U
-
=
-
=
¢- -
= =
¢ ¢=
å¢= = åå å
                                                (30) 
Next, she corrects the Gaussian noise on jU ¢  to get jU . From these she rebuilds the error-free full key 
 ( )( 0 1: , , TN d N dU U -ÎK   ) .                                                           (31) 
 
3.2 Security of scalar reconciliation  
The scalar reconciliation provides unconditional security. It will be demonstrated for reverse reconciliation. The security 
of scalar reconciliation is guaranteed by the fact that the transmitted ( )j jC ¢X U  messages have uniform distribution, and 
the multiplied jU  and j¢X  vectors are also uniform and independent. The following conditional probability holds for 
each jU : 
( )( ) 10...1 2Pr j j jU U C ¢= X U = .                                                       (32) 
Since ( )j jC ¢X U  are uniformly distributed, and also independent [11], it follows that: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1, ,0 , 1Pr j i j j N NC X C X C X -¢ ¢ ¢=  =                                             (33) 
and 
( ) 10...1 2Pr jU U= = .                                                                (34) 
 
 
 
 
Since the overall number of d-dimensional  vectors is dj ÎU  N d , the probability that Eve obtains the full key  is K
( )( ) 10 1 2Pr , , .N dTEve N dU U -æ ö÷ç ÷=ç ÷ç ÷çè øK  =                                                   (35) 
For the further details see [27]. 
4.  ERROR ANALYSIS OF SCALAR RECONCILIATION 
The error probability ( ) ( 12Pr a berror Q h-= )  of scalar reconciliation depends only on a b- , where 
( ) (1 12 2Pra b a bQ h h- -= )g<  is the Q-function (tail function) of a standard Gaussian random variable , 
and 
( )0,1g Î 
,
12
0
2
j j i
d
idh s s
-
== = å d  is the standard deviation of the Gaussian noise jd . The  exponentially 
converges to zero for any 
(Pr error )
2a b h- > . 
 
Let  
{ } 1 ,0, dj j iiU a b U-=Î = å ,                                                              (36) 
( ) (1 ,0d )j j iiC X C X-== å                                                               (37) 
and  
( ) (1 ,0d )j j iiC C-=D = Då .                                                             (38) 
In the scalar reconciliation process Alice decides on the scalar quantity , if: jU ¢ = a
( ) (Pr Pr )j j jU a U U b U¢= ³ = j¢
b
.                                                     (39) 
Similarly, she decides on , if: jU ¢ =
( ) (Pr Pr )j j jU b U U a U¢= ³ = j¢ .                                                      (40) 
Conditioned on a  or b , the received jU ¢  has mean  or , with  and .  a am = b bm = ( )2,am h ( )2,bm h
Applying the maximum-likelihood-based correction rule [15-19], Alice calculates with the following inequalities: 
( ) ( )2 2
2 2
2 2
21 1
2 2
j jU a U b
e e
h
ph ph
æ ö æ÷ ÷ç ¢ ç ¢- -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç- -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷÷ç çè ø è³ 2h
ö
÷÷ø                                                         (41) 
and: 
( ) ( )2 2
2 2
2 2
21 1
2 2
j jU b U a
e e
h
ph ph
æ ö æ÷ ÷ç ¢ ç ¢- -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç- -÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷ ÷ç ç÷÷ç çè ø è³ 2h
ö
÷÷ø ,                                                        (42) 
which then leads to: 
j jU a U b¢ ¢- < -                                                                      (43) 
and: 
j jU a U b¢ ¢- > - .                                                                     (44) 
The received jU ¢  has mean  or , hence one obtains the following conditional probability for an error a am = b bm =
 
 
 
 
event, conditioned on Bob has sent :    jU a=
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )(2 2Pr Pr ,)j a ba b jU Uj j jC XU a U C m mm m -+¢ ¢< = = = D >                    (45)                          j jj jC XU C= D
where 
2
a bm m-  assigns a decision boundary. The tail function  
( ) (1 12 2Pra b a bQ h h- -= )g<
)
,                                                          (46) 
where , has exponential decay for any (0,1g Î  2a b h- > , hence:  
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                                 (47) 
which clearly demonstrates that the error probability of scalar reconciliation exponentially converges to zero. As one can 
readily obtain from (47), for arbitrary large differences between a and b [15-17],  ( )12 0a bQ h-  .                                                                        (48)  
Alice’s error-correction strategy is illustrated in Fig. 2. Alice chooses a  if 
2
a b
jU
m m+¢ < , and selects b , if 
2
a b
jU
m m+¢ >  
holds. 
          
 
 
Figure 2. Alice’s error correction in the scalar space. Alice corrects each U  to rebuild the full key, . The noise on a given  has 
variance , which arises from the quantum channel. The Gaussian noise of the quantum-level transmission is survived on the raw-
data level, and it has distorted Bob’s secret  into  on Alice’s side. 
j
¢ K
j
jU ¢
2h
jU j jU U d¢ = +
 
Thanks to the apparatus provided by maximum-likelihood decision theory and to the application of the Bayes’ rule [15-
19], for a given jU  one obtains error probability:  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1
2 2
1
2
Pr Pr
Pr ,
a b
a b
j j
a b
U U
Q
error
m m
h
h
-+
-
¢ < =
=
=
g<
                                                              (49) 
 
 
 
 
which clearly demonstrates that  depends only on the distance ( )Pr error a b-  of a and b.  
The exponential decay of s depicted in Fig. 3. 
 
( )Pr error  i
 
Figure 3. The error probability of the scalar reconciliation process. It converges exponentially to zero as 2a b h- > . 
 
The condition 2a b h- >  can be trivially satisfied by the parties in any practical CVQKD scenario; the proposed 
results complete the statement. For the further details see [27]. 
he continuous-variable QKD systems have a great advantage over the DVQKD protocols that can be established over 
municati
ay CVQKD protocols are equipped with much stronger 
hardware in comparison to the one-w he efficient post-processing, up to this point, 
made it not possible to exploit the real  CVQKD protocols are based on Gaussian 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
T
the current telecom on networks and require only standard network components and devices. The one-way 
CVQKD protocols have almost reached their physical limits, and no further exploitable resources remain to significantly 
improve the key rates and transmission distances. The two-w
ay protocols, however the lack of t
 potential of the protocol. The
modulation, and powerful post-processing is needed to maximize the extractable valuable information from the 
correlated raw data. The physical layer solutions for the reconciliation of Gaussian variables require tomography that is 
intractable in a practical CVQKD scenario. The reconciliation is also possible in the level of the logical layer by a 
classical authenticated communication channel and by traditional algorithmical tools. The multidimensional approaches 
were developed for this purpose, however the use of complex multidimensional calculations is also not desirable in a 
practical CVQKD scenario, moreover it has strict limitations on the available dimensions. The proposed scalar 
reconciliation eliminates the use of multidimensional spherical space along with the dimensional boundaries and can be 
used in arbitrary high dimensions. The scalar reconciliation process neither requires any physical-layer tomography [1-
8], and only standard operations and calculations needed in the level of raw data. The method provides unconditional 
security, and allows a much easier implementation to maximize the extractable valuable binary information from the 
correlated raw data to significantly boost up the key rates and to improve the distance ranges of two-way CVQKD.  
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